INTRODUCTION
Joint External Evaluation (JEE) missions are designed to assess member state capabilities to prevent, detect and respond to public health threats arising from naturally occurring, deliberate or accidental origins. The mission also aims to identify urgent needs and points of progress that will rapidly enhance a country's capabilities. A report for each mission is officially published on the WHO website (1) . The JEE mission programme's overarching goal is to demonstrate the compliance of each member state with the International Health Regulation (IHR) 2005 (2) , the purpose and scope of which is 'to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade'.
Each JEE mission is completed in two stages, the first being the completion of a self-assessment survey based on the JEE tool in which designated in-country experts review the 19 technical areas and produce a provisional evaluation report based on the JEE tool (3) . The second stage of the mission involves the external assessment team visiting the country, assessing the selfreported data and actively engaging with country's stakeholders in order to independently assess the country's IHR capability for ensuring health security. Field visits are conducted as part of the external expert review after which the external evaluation team discusses and proposes a draft report and a provisional score.
The 'radiation emergencies' technical area is evaluated against two different indicators (Annex 1).
• RE.1: Mechanisms are established and functioning for detecting and responding to radiological and nuclear emergencies.
• RE.2: Enabling environment is in place for management of Radiation Emergencies.
INDICATORS AND SCORES
The spectrum of scoring is from 1 to 5, with 1 being the lowest (no capability) and 5 being the highest (sustainable capability). The countries assessed during the missions scored between 1 (No Capacity) to 3 (Developed Capacity) for both indicators RE.1 and RE.2. It is worth mentioning that limiting factors intrinsic to the JEE tool itself, will preclude countries from achieving high scores depending on their specific risk profile.
Strengths and best practices for indicator RE.1
• All of the countries assessed had some form of national policies for managing radiation emergencies whether already implemented or in an advanced draft form.
• Radiation experts emphasised the importance of a strong regulatory framework as being one of the most important features of radiation emergency preparedness. It was stressed that the likelihood of occurrence of a radiation emergency is likely to be greatly reduced with the implementation of a strong regulatory system for the safe use of radioactive sources. Most pieces of legislation were found to incorporate a chapter covering radiation EPR arrangements or mentioning the existence of a National Radiation Emergency Plan.
• A National Radiation Emergency Response Plan (NRERP) was implemented in Bahrain and Jordan and was in a relatively advanced draft format in the three other countries at the time of the missions. Most countries have not taken any action so far to test their national radiation emergencies arrangements, however some countries participated in recent years in international nuclear/radiation exercises based on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) initiatives. Radiation experts emphasised the benefits of practice and exercising to identify areas for improvement in plans and embed knowledge with those involved in response.
• Every country assessed had a dedicated national expert centre equipped with specialist staff and monitoring resources. In some countries the expertise for radiation emergency response was shared between several expert bodies reporting to different ministries (Health, Energy, Education…). These centres were deemed able to deal with low scale radiation emergencies which represent the most foreseeable radiation incident scenario likely to occur in these countries.
Enabling the countries to deal with medium and large scale scenario would require significant improvement as explained in the paragraphs below of the present document.
Points of progress for indicator RE.1
• The assessment revealed that several countries did not have a clear organigram showing the roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder involved in the response. Instead, tacit agreements are often favoured, reflecting cultural practices. The creation of a multipartite NRERP enforced through radiation/nuclear regulatory legislation, was deemed as an important step towards effective emergency arrangements. Such plans should be based on a comprehensive risk assessments taking into account the existing radiation hazards within the country (4) (see Annex 2). A contingency plan for each risk should then be developed, defining the roles and responsibilities of each of the stakeholders.
The plan should ideally be tested on a regular basis, with regulatory exercises and drills, umpired by the regulator. Corrective actions should be enforced for stakeholders not compliant with their legal duty as notified in the plan.
• Standard operating procedures (SOPs) were found to be a common area for improvement in the countries assessed. They were usually nonexistent or developed locally (e.g. hospitals, Fire and Rescue Services…) and without any control from the expert bodies. The radiation experts supporting the JEE mission advised countries to develop these SOPs as a priority action for all the stakeholders involved in the NRERP, in particular for the first responders. These SOPs should be scenario based, be written by technically competent bodies and be approved by the regulator in cooperation with responders. They should set out step by step procedures of intervention for each radiation related incident type. The SOPs should also be referenced in the national or local plans and be tested during exercises.
• Industries such as metal scrap facilities, concrete production and waste management sites were found in general not equipped with any systematic radiation detection capability. Within the EU, standardised legislation such as the EURATOM Council Directive 2013/59 (5) encourages member states to establish detection systems on such facilities. In practice, many countries have adopted this recommendation as a mandatory requirement in their legislation by making it illegal to import radioactive product on such premises. Other companies went ahead of such recommendation and acquired monitoring devices in order to avoid catastrophic consequences would a radioactive source be processed (and incinerated for example). Following the defence-in-depth approach, many countries have implemented three barriers of control, as an effective way of decreasing the likelihood of being confronted with an unexpected radioactive source: − A robust regulatory system for the material imported legally. − Detection devices at the PoE for illicit material entering the country. − Detection systems at waste processing facilities for existing (orphan) sources within the country.
• The control of the Points of Entry (PoE) is an important part of the detection strategy of country with regard to radioactive sources. As a matter of fact, both the IHR (Article 22.1.a) and the JEE tool (technical area 17: 'Desired Impact: Timely detection and effective response of any potential hazards that occur at PoE.') equally stress the importance of the control of the PoE. Three of the countries assessed where equipped with portal monitors at some of their major PoE. Other PoE are either not controlled or partially controlled with handheld monitors. Systematic monitoring devices (portal monitors, electronic dosemeters) to the major PoE is a common practice in Europe for example, and enables the country to control the importation of illegal radioactive substances. Random sampling presents the risk of letting through illegal radioactive material, and therefore should solely be considered as an additional control technique to the systematic control of the goods and people.
The lack of systematic monitoring of imported goods, foodstuffs and people at PoE may result in greatly limited control of radioactive material, both legal and illegal, entering the country. In order to mitigate this issue, some countries like Jordan are randomly sampling imported shipments, but that only addresses partially the problem, as radioactive material can still enter the country undetected.
Strengths and best practices for indicator RE.2
• All the countries assessed were equipped with basic forms of radiation monitoring equipment. This included dose rate and contamination monitors, but also passive and electronic personal dosimetry. Transportable spectrometers (Caesium Zinc Telluride-CZT type mostly) were also in use in most countries. Some of this equipment was part of a national purchase programme, whereas other were given to countries for support through US or EU aid programmes. High resolution gamma spectrometry (High Purity Germanium spectrometers) were also in use in every country assessed, albeit for the sole purpose of environmental monitoring. The radiation expert advised that the same assets could be used for internal dosimetry analysis and discussions are currently ongoing with the identified countries to help them acquire this capability through procedural development.
Other specific monitoring assets such as liquid scintillation and Energy Dispersive X-ray fluorescence techniques were also in use in some of the countries, although not for emergency internal contamination monitoring purposes.
• Most countries assessed had implemented a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) training programme for their first responders, trained through national or international support projects. This usually included the Civil Defence teams, special units of the Ministry of Defence and custom officers. In addition, some countries had adopted formal procedures, including Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs) with their first responders, to provide technical support on suspicion or detection of radioactive material.
• National automated monitoring networks for the detection of national or international radioactive atmospheric releases were implemented in three of the countries visited. The equipment used consisted in automated gamma monitors, and among them only two countries were equipped with gross alpha/ beta large volume air sampling and analysis capability. These networks are operational 24/7 and countries are involved in information exchange arrangements on the international level through the IAEA.
Points of progress for indicator RE.2
• In general, the countries assessed were well prepared for small scale incidents such as sealed source recovery but would be challenged by medium to large scale scenarios affecting several tens of people or greater. In particular, no provisions had been made for the referral, transport and decontamination/treatment of large numbers of affected people.
• The university courses for medical personnel were found to not include radiation protection modules, and as such doctors are not trained to recognise Acute Radiation Syndrome or how to handle exposed/contaminated patients. Likewise, it was advised that hospitals and laboratories could be included in response plans for triaging people in case of a major radio-nuclear event. This could be done using the existing infrastructures by training medical specialists on the Medical Treatment Protocol (METREPOL) approach based on the prodromal and haematologic condition of patients (6) .
• Atmospherical dispersion modelling was found to be non-existent in every country assessed. Simple scenarios such as Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) or transport accident scenario with fire could prove to be challenging for countries as a result. To overcome this issue international assistance can be required through framework agreement such as the IAEA Response and Assistance NETwork (RANET) (7) .
• Similarly, internal dosimetry capabilities by whole body monitoring or in vitro measurements are not implemented despite some countries having the monitoring assets to do so.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRIORITY ACTIONS
Recommendations were made for each individual country on the basis of identified areas for improvement in their emergency preparedness and response capabilities. Recommendations are therefore country specific. However, a certain pattern can be drawn on shared points of progress as seen in the paragraphs above of the present document.
• At the time of the missions, four of the countries assessed still had to develop and enforce an official versions of a NRERP. This should be seen as a matter of priority together with a comprehensive regulation framework backing any aspect of the use and management of ionising radiation, including the National Radiation Emergency
Response Plan. A strong regulatory framework and a clear distribution of the roles and responsibilities amongst ministries is an absolute necessity for any country aspiring to the safe use of ionising radiation. • Although strategic and tactical level documentation supporting radio-nuclear EPR arrangements were found at different stages of development or approval, operational documentation was for the overwhelming majority of the countries assessed found to be non-existent. First and second responders, directly involved in the mitigation of a radiation emergency, have little to no formal procedures to refer to. SOPs should therefore be developed and implemented for any responder involved in the emergency as described in the NRERP.
• Internal monitoring techniques and atmospheric dispersion modelling were identified as an important part of the emergency response arrangements, mostly because countries identified accidental scenarios associated with these risks. Some of the laboratories visited during the missions were equipped with monitoring instruments capable of measuring excretas for internal contamination but were not used for this purpose at the time of the mission.
Public Health England-Centre for Radiation Chemical and Environmental Hazards (PHE-CRCE) in its role as a WHO collaborating centre and a member of the WHO Radiation Emergency Medical Preparedness and Assistance Network (REMPAN) has provided protocols and software shortly after the end of the mission to help address both issues.
• Finally, the use of hospitals for the radiological triage of patients was deemed a low cost option which could dramatically improve a country's capabilities to deal with medium to large scale events, without the need for significant additional resources. This action would nevertheless requires some form of training, or train-the-trainer programme, for medical personnel in order to enable them to identify Acute Radiation Syndrome, prodromal syndrome and blood count test analysis for radiologically injured patients. In addition, joining WHO REMPAN network would also allow countries to benefit from the access to the technical expertise, training programmes and information sharing (8) .
INITIATIVES TO FILL IDENTIFIED GAPS
Following the completion of each mission and the formal approval of the report by country's internal experts, PHE-CRCE actively engaged with their radiation specialist counterparts to address the gaps raised during the mission. To this effect, an 'electronic package' was provided for three of the visited countries, containing example of legislation, plans and SoPs currently used in the UK, together with technical documents, handbooks and software used within PHE-CRCE for the response to radiation emergencies.
Technical advice and regular communication between the PHE-CRCE and the specialist centres in country contributes to forge links and scientific collaboration with the ultimate goal to improve global knowledge on radiation EPR techniques and arrangements. CONCLUSION JEE mission proved to be valuable for every party involved in the process. The provision of a fair assessment based on knowledgeable expertise was well valued by stakeholders. The outcome of each mission was very positive and not only enabled an overarching enhancement of each country's capabilities in term of radiation emergency preparedness and response, but also provided useful networking opportunities between expert centres for future collaboration.
